Attentional biases in problem and non-problem gamblers by Ciccarelli, M et al.
See	discussions,	stats,	and	author	profiles	for	this	publication	at:	https://www.researchgate.net/publication/298806884
Attentional	biases	in	problem	and	non-
problem	gamblers
ARTICLE		in		JOURNAL	OF	AFFECTIVE	DISORDERS	·	MARCH	2016
Impact	Factor:	3.38	·	DOI:	10.1016/j.jad.2016.03.009
READS
57
5	AUTHORS,	INCLUDING:
Giovanna	Nigro
Second	University	of	Naples
35	PUBLICATIONS			159	CITATIONS			
SEE	PROFILE
Mark	D	Griffiths
Nottingham	Trent	University
754	PUBLICATIONS			15,054	CITATIONS			
SEE	PROFILE
Marina	Cosenza
Second	University	of	Naples
17	PUBLICATIONS			33	CITATIONS			
SEE	PROFILE
Francesca	D'Olimpio
Second	University	of	Naples
32	PUBLICATIONS			613	CITATIONS			
SEE	PROFILE
All	in-text	references	underlined	in	blue	are	linked	to	publications	on	ResearchGate,
letting	you	access	and	read	them	immediately.
Available	from:	Maria	Ciccarelli
Retrieved	on:	24	March	2016
Attentional biases in problem and non-problem gamblers 
 
Maria Ciccarelli 1*, Giovanna Nigro 1, Mark D. Griffiths 2, Marina Cosenza 1, Francesca 
D'Olimpio 1 
1 Department of Psychology, Second University of Naples, Caserta, Italy 
2 Psychology Division, Nottingham Trent University, UK 
*  email address of the corresponding author: maria.ciccarelli@unina2.it 
 
 
Abstract  
Background: From a cognitive perspective, attentional biases are deemed as factors responsible 
in the onset and development of gambling disorder. However, knowledge relating to attentional 
processes in gambling is scarce and studies to date have reported contrasting results. Moreover, 
no study has ever examined which component and what type of bias are involved in attentional 
polarization in gambling. Methods: In the present study, 108 Italian participants, equally 
divided into problem and non-problem gamblers were administered a modified Posner Task, 
an attentional paradigm in which – through the manipulation of stimuli presentation time – it 
is possible to measure both initial orienting and maintenance of attention. In addition to the 
experimental task, participants completed self-report measures involving (i) craving (Gambling 
Craving Scale), (ii) depression, anxiety and stress (Depression Anxiety Stress Scale) and (iii) 
emotional dysregulation (Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale). Results: Analyses revealed 
facilitation in detecting gambling-related stimuli at the encoding level in problem gamblers but 
not in non-problem gamblers. Compared to non-problem gamblers, problem gamblers also 
reported higher levels of craving, emotional dysregulation, and negative mood states. 
Furthermore, all measures correlated with the gambling severity. Limitations: The use of 
indirect measure of attentional bias could be less accurate compared to direct measures. 
Conclusions: The facilitation in detecting gambling-related stimuli in problem gamblers and 
the correlation between subjective craving and facilitation bias suggests that attentional 
polarization could not be due to a conditioning process but that motivational factors such as 
craving could induce addicted-related seeking-behaviors. 
 
Keywords: attentional bias; craving; emotions; gambling; problem gambling 
 
 
HIGHLIGHTS 
Attentional bias, emotions and craving in gamblers and controls were assessed 
Problem gamblers showed facilitation bias compared to controls 
Problem gamblers reported high craving and negative mood states 
Problem gamblers showed high emotional dysregulation 
Correlations between facilitation bias and craving were observed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
A large body of research has demonstrated that addictions are characterized by attentional 
biases toward addiction-related stimuli (see Field and Cox, 2008 for a review). Attentional 
bias can be defined as an automatic and uncontrollable tendency to allocate attention towards 
stimuli related to the individual’s area of concern (Robinson and Berridge, 2008). Studies that 
have examined the attentional biases in addictions to nicotine (Ehrman et al., 2002), alcohol 
(Townshend and Duka, 2001), cannabis (Field et al., 2004), cocaine (Copersino et al., 2004), 
and gambling (Hønsi et al., 2013) have shown that addiction-related stimuli are processed 
more efficiently by addicted individuals, further strengthening irrational cognitions and 
maladaptive behaviors (Field and Cox, 2008; Field et al., 2009).  
 
As proposed by Robinson and Berridge’s (1993, 2008) incentive-sensitization model, stimuli 
associated with reward, through a classical conditioning process (such as substance-related or 
gambling-related stimuli), induce sensitization in the mesocorticolimbic dopamine system in 
the brain. This sensitization generates craving for addiction stimuli that captures attention and 
determines attentional biases, contributing to the maintenance of the disorder and leading to 
possible relapse. In the specific case of gambling, the continuous exposure to gambling can 
facilitate the detection of gambling-related stimuli in the environment, which can trigger a 
relapse through conditioned responses. In fact, once a gambling-related stimulus is detected, 
it can be processed automatically, making difficult to shift attention away from it. Moreover, 
since the attention is a limited resource, directing attention to a specific category of stimuli 
prevents the possibility of other stimuli being attended to (Kastner et al., 1998). 
 
In the context of addictions that do not involve the ingestion of psychoactive substances, such 
as gambling disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), knowledge relating to 
attentional processes is scarce. Studies carried out have reported contrasting results, probably 
due to the variety of instruments and/or to small sample sizes. 
 
The most commonly used attentional instrument is the addiction Stroop Task (Cox et al., 
2006). Using this instrument (in which people are required to read the color of the words, 
ignoring their semantic content), gamblers have been found to be slower to respond to 
gambling-related words and commit more errors compared to healthy controls (Boyer and 
Dickerson, 2003; McCusker and Gettings, 1997; Molde et al., 2010). Diskin and Hodgin’s 
(1999) experimental study measured the reaction times of gamblers and non-gamblers to 
neutral stimuli such as a light during a gambling episode. They reported that regular gamblers 
took longer to react to irrelevant stimuli, demonstrating that gambling experience captures the 
attention of regular gamblers to a greater extent than among occasional gamblers.  
 
Other research has found that problem gamblers display more signs of error-related 
attentional biases to gambling stimuli and commit more errors on response inhibition task in 
gambling-related trials (van Holst et al., 2012). However, some studies have failed to support 
the evidence of attentional biases in gambling. For example, Diskin and Hodgins (2001), in 
an effort to replicate their first (1999) experiment, confirmed only partially the pattern of 
results and (unlike their first study) did not find differences in the reaction times between 
occasional and problem gamblers. Similarly, Atkins and Sharpe (2003) examined reaction 
times with a modified Stroop Task in high- and low-frequency problem gamblers and found 
no difference between the two groups. Other studies have found no differences in the speed 
of reading relevant words between gamblers and control groups when the participants were 
not under the effect of dopamine agonist (Zack and Poulos, 2004) or antagonist (Zack and 
Poulos, 2007). These findings, that do not support the presence of attentional biases among 
gamblers, are probably due to the small samples (Atkins and Sharpe, 2003; Zack and Poulos, 
2004, 2007) and/or to the absence of problem gambling among participants (Atkins and 
Sharpe, 2003). 
 
In addition, some issues remain unanswered. Firstly, it is not clear which attentional 
component is involved in gambling disorder. Researchers have distinguished between two 
components of selective attention: orienting and maintenance (Allport, 1989; LaBerge, 1995). 
Orienting refers to the rapid and automatic shift of attention (that occurs within 200 ms), 
while maintenance refers to slow and continuous stimuli elaboration (that occurs within 500 
ms or more) (Field and Cox, 2008; Field et al., 2009; Noel et al., 2006). To date, the majority 
of the studies evaluating attentional biases have employed the addiction Stroop Task that is 
unanimously considered a measure of the early stages of cognitive processing (Cox et al., 
2006). Other studies (e.g., Grant and Bowling, 2015; Vizcaino et al., 2013) found no bias in 
attentional engagement and demonstrated that gambling frequency is associated with the 
maintenance of attention when using gambling-related stimuli. A recent study (Brevers et al., 
2011b) used an attentional paradigm that allows the evaluation of these two attentional 
components. The study found that problem gamblers (compared to controls) were faster to 
detect gambling-related changes and showed biases in the initial orienting of attention.  
 Furthermore, it is necessary to examine the nature of gambling-related attentional biases. 
Recently, three types of biases have been distinguished (Cisler and Koster, 2010): 
facilitation, that is the easiness to direct attention towards valenced stimuli (in this specific 
case, gambling-related cues in respect to neutral ones); avoidance, namely the tendency to 
avoid specific cues, allocating attention away from these; and disengagement, referring to a 
difficulty in diverting attention from these stimuli. Using a direct measure of attention (i.e., 
eye-tracking technology), Brevers and colleagues (2011a) observed a facilitation to respond 
to gambling-related pictures and a difficulty in disengaging attention away from these, 
namely a prolonged maintenance on gambling stimuli, with problem gamblers directing their 
gaze more frequently towards gambling stimuli. 
 
Secondly, the relationship between craving and attentional biases is not clear. In Field’s 
(2009) meta-analysis, a relationship between craving and attentional biases in drug addictions 
was detected, while, in the field of gambling, these results have not been confirmed (Brevers 
et al., 2011a; Wölfling et al., 2011) except in one study (i.e., Molde et al., 2010) that observed 
a correlation between attentional biases and abstinence. The relationship between craving and 
attentional biases on gambling-related stimuli needs clarifying as this could have important 
theoretical and practical implications. A correlation between these two constructs may 
indicate that attentional biases are not only the consequence of a classical conditioning 
process but that are associated with motivational states such as craving, and that a 
psychotherapeutic intervention on motivations to gamble may have an influence on biases.  
 
Moreover, in the gambling studies literature, the role of gambling activity as a way to escape 
from negative emotions or mood is well known (Wood and Griffiths, 2007). In several 
studies that have examined gambling motivation, one of the most reported motivations is the 
use of gambling as a relief from negative psychological states (Blaszczynski and 
McConaghy, 1989; Blaszczynski and Nower, 2002; Dickerson et al., 1996). The refuge in 
gambling is not only a way to ameliorate mood states (e.g., Wood and Griffiths, 2007) but it 
may serve as a way to experience excitement and relieving boredom (Griffiths, 1995). 
Gambling involvement is also associated with the inability to manage emotions. For instance, 
Williams, Grisham, Erskine, and Cassedy (2012) reported that gamblers experience a high 
lack of emotional clarity and awareness and have a difficulty in adopting emotion-regulation 
strategies. Since the relationship between emotions and attentional bias has never been 
investigated, it is hypothesized that negative emotions and the inability to manage them in a 
healthy and functional way are likely to be associated with a tendency to allocate attention to 
very specific stimuli, such as gambling-related ones, and provide relief from them. Such 
issues have yet to be empirically addressed.  
 
The comprehension of both the type of attentional biases and the attentional components 
involved in gambling disorder may help clinicians in the psychotherapeutic programs to aim 
their focus towards attentional modification. In light of this background, the purpose of the 
present study was threefold. Firstly, attentional biases in healthy controls and problem 
gamblers were measured, using a modified version of the Posner Task with exposure times 
assessing both early attentional processing and maintenance. Secondly the differentiation of 
three types of attentional biases was investigated. Finally, the relationships between these 
variables were analyzed. 
 
Among indirect measures of biases, the choice to employ the Posner Task paradigm steams 
from two reasons. Firstly, through manipulation of cue presentation time, it allowed the 
assessment of biases at two levels: early orientation (100 ms) and maintenance of attention 
(500 ms). Secondly, the use of images (as opposed to words or other types of stimuli) is 
reported in the literature as being more suited to capturing attentional biases (Molde et al., 
2010). 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the present study is the first to evaluate attentional 
processing, craving, emotional dysregulation, and emotional distress in both problem 
gamblers and healthy controls. It was hypothesized that there would be facilitation bias in 
problem gamblers but not in healthy controls. Finally, it was hypothesized that there would 
be positive correlations between attentional biases, craving, negative emotions, and emotional 
dysregulation.  
 
Method 
Participants  
The sample comprised 108 male participants, with ages ranging from 21 to 63 years 
(M=36.80; SD=11.52). The psychological literature has consistently reported that men are 
more likely than women to be problem gamblers (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). Participants were divided into two groups based on South Oaks Gambling Screen 
(SOGS; Lesieur and Blume, 1987). These were non-problem gamblers (N=54) that scored 
from 0 to 2, gamblers at risk (N=19) with a score equal to 3-4, and problem gamblers (N=35) 
that scored from 5 to 20 (the maximum being 17 in the present sample). Since no significant 
differences were found in attentional biases, emotional distress, emotional dysregulation, and 
craving between the ‘gamblers at-risk’ and the ‘problem gamblers’, they were combined into 
a single group (‘problem gamblers’) for the present study, in line with Lee et al.’s study 
(2011). Non-problem gamblers (NPGs; N=54) and problem gamblers (PGs; N=54) groups 
were matched for age, (NPGs=37.20 years, PGs=36.39 years; t106=0.37, p=.71) and number 
of years of education, (NPGs=11.57 years, PGs=11.72 years; t106=-0.25, p=.80). 
 
Measures 
Modified version of Posner Task (PT; Posner, 1980): The modified PT is a computerized 
version of a detecting attentional biases task. It was administered on a PC using the 
experimental software SuperLab 4.0 and the operating system Windows 8. The stimuli 
comprised 40 color pictures, chosen from non-copyrighted images on the Internet. Among 
these, 20 were ‘gambling’ pictures depicting slot machines, chips, lottery tickets, and 20 were 
‘neutral’ pictures portraying petrol pumps, buttons and watches. The gambling and neutral 
pictures were matched for both color and shape. Each picture measured 350 x 350 pixels and 
a personal computer with a 15.6” monitor was used to display the pictures on a grey 
background.  
 
The task comprised 160 trials. The position of gambling images and the position of the dot 
were not balanced across trials so that 80% of the trials were valid (128 trials, 64 gambling 
and 64 neutral), where the target appears in the same location of the image that preceded it, 
and 20% of the trials were invalid (32 trials, 16 gambling and 16 neutral), where the target 
was presented in the opposite side (Posner, 1980). Each trial begins with a fixation point 
(“+”) (ITI; 1 cm in height) presented for 1000 ms, followed by an image, in the left or right 
side of the screen for a fixed period of 100 or 500 ms, after which it was immediately 
substituted by a dot (target). The dot is blue and appears in the same position of the picture 
(valid trial) or on the opposite side (invalid trial) for 1500 ms (see Figure 1).  
 
Each image appears four times, as a valid and invalid trial, both for 100 and 500 ms. The 
manipulation of the duration of the stimulus allows the investigation of different attentional 
components (e.g., Bradley et al., 2004; Field and Cox, 2008). A stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA) from 50 to 200 ms measures bias in the initial orienting of attention (facilitation 
and/or avoidance), because it allows only one shift of attention, whereas an SOA of 500 ms 
provides a longer time to make changes in gaze direction and reflects a bias in the 
maintenance or disengagement of attention (Field and Cox, 2008; Field et al., 2009).  
 
Participants were seated 60 cm from the monitor and levelled with the center of the screen. 
They were asked to press a button on a keyboard (marked with white stickers) based on the 
location of the occurrence of the probe: “a” for left and “ù” for right. Participants were tested 
individually and instructed to respond to the probe as quickly and accurately as possible. 
Both accuracy and response times (RTs) were recorded. 
 
Preliminary phase: validation of gambling-related pictures for the development of a modified 
version of Posner Task: As noted above, 80 images were chosen from the internet (40 
gambling-related and 40 neutral pictures), and matched for color and shape. Twenty 
independent judges (10 males; mean age 26 years; SD= 3.8) were asked to evaluate the 
gambling relevance, pleasure, and arousal evoked by each image on a Likert scale from 0 
(“not at all”) to 9 (“very much”). For the construction of the modified version of PT, 20 
gambling images were selected that received the highest scores on gambling relevance (mean 
gambling relevance = 7.26), whereas the 20 images with the lowest scores was chosen as 
neutral (mean gambling relevance=0.65). Gambling and neutral images were no different on 
pleasure (gambling=2.26; neutral=2.66) and arousal (gambling=2.55; neutral=2.78). 
 
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur and Blume, 1987; Italian translation by 
Cosenza et al., 2014). The SOGS comprises 20 self-report items with dichotomous (yes/no) 
answers, based on the DSM criteria for pathological gambling (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980) and assesses the frequency and the severity of gambling problems. The 
scores vary from 0 to 20. Scores from 0 to 2 indicate no gambling problems, scores of 3-4 
indicate the risk of developing gambling problems, and a score of 5 or above denotes problem 
and (probable) pathological gambling involvement. Typical items are “When you gamble, 
how often you go back another day to win back the money you lost?” and “Have people ever 
criticized your gambling?” SOGS items in the present study were found to have a high 
internal consistency reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha=.92, 95% CI [.91, .93]). 
 
Gambling Craving Scale (GACS; Young and Wohl, 2009; translated into Italian for the 
present study). The GACS is a multidimensional measure of gambling-related craving, 
comprising nine items assessing three different dimensions: anticipation (e.g., “If I had an 
opportunity of gamble right now, I would probably take it”), desire (e.g., “I need to gamble 
now”), and relief (e.g., “Gambling would make me less depressed”). For each item, 
respondents have to indicate agreement on a 7-point Likert scale from “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree”. In the present study, internal consistency for the total scale (α= .89, 95% CI 
[.85, .92]) and for each scale was adequate: desire (α= .94, 95% CI [.92, .96]), anticipation 
(α= .79, 95% CI [.72, .85]), and relief (α= .77, 95% CI [.69, .84]).  
 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz and Roemer, 2004; Italian validation 
by Sighinolfi et al., 2010). The DERS is a 36-item self-report questionnaire assessing several 
aspects of emotional dysregulation. It comprises six subscales: non-acceptance of emotional 
responses (e.g., “When I’m upset, I feel ashamed with myself for feeling that way”), 
difficulties engaging in goal-directed behavior (e.g., “When I’m upset, I have difficulty 
focusing on other things”), Impulse control difficulties (e.g., “When I’m upset, I have 
difficulty controlling my behaviors”), lack of emotional awareness (e.g., “I care about what I 
am feeling”, reverse coded), limited access to emotion regulation strategies (e.g., “When I’m 
upset, I believe that there is nothing I can do to make myself feel better”) and lack of 
emotional clarity (e.g., “I have difficulty making sense out of my feelings”). Participants are 
asked to indicate how much each statement describes them with a 5-point Likert scale from 1 
(almost never) to 5 (almost always). Higher scores suggest greater problems with emotion 
regulation. In the present study, Cronbach's alpha for the full scale was .91 (95% CI [.89, 
.93]) and .80, (95% CI [.73, .85]) for non-acceptance of emotional responses, .81 (95% CI 
[.75, .86]) for difficulties engaging in goal-directed behavior, .83 (95% CI [.78, .88]) for 
impulse control difficulties, .51 (95% CI [.36, .64]) for lack of emotional awareness, .81 
(95% CI [.76, .86]) for limited access to emotion regulation strategies, and .71 (95% CI [.61, 
.79]) for lack of emotional clarity. 
 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21; Henry and Crawford, 2005; Italian validation by 
Bottesi et al., 2015). The DASS-21 is the short and validated version of the original version 
(Lovibond and Lovibond, 1995) that contained 41 items. It assesses emotional feelings and 
mood states in the past two weeks with a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (did not apply to me at 
all) to 3 (applied to me very much, or most of the time). In the short version, there are 7 items 
for each of the three dimensions: depression (e.g., “I could see nothing to be hopeful about”), 
anxiety (e.g., “I felt scared without any good reason”) and stress (e.g., “I tended to over-react 
to situations”). Higher scores indicate severe emotional distress. In this study, internal 
consistency for the total scale (α= .92, 95% CI [.90,.94]) and for each subscale was adequate: 
depression (α= .86, 95% CI [.81,.89]), anxiety (α= .77, 95% CI [.70, .83]), and stress (α= .86, 
95% CI [.81, .89]). 
 
Procedure  
The ethics committee of the research team’s university department approved the present 
study, and informed consent was obtained prior to enrolment. Prior to testing, participants 
were assured that all measures were anonymous and that they could withdraw whenever they 
wanted. A code number was assigned to each participant to ensure anonymity. In a quiet 
room and individually, participants performed the Modified version of Posner Task and then 
filled in the questionnaires. After the experimental session, participants were debriefed and 
the purpose of the experiment was revealed and all their questions were answered. 
Participation in the study was voluntary and participants did not receive any reward. 
 
Data preparation 
Three types of attentional biases were calculated: facilitation, avoidance and disengagement, 
only for correct responses. Facilitation score was calculated from valid trials, subtracting 
reaction times for gambling-related stimuli from neutral stimuli. Positive facilitation scores 
indicate that attention is captured by gambling cues more greatly than by neutral images. 
Disengagement score was obtained by subtracting reaction times for neutral stimuli from 
gambling-related stimuli from invalid trials. Positive disengagement scores indicate 
disengagement biases (i.e. a prolonged maintenance of attention on gambling-related stimuli 
rather than neutral stimuli). Negative values of both facilitation and disengagement bias 
indicate avoidance biases, namely a tendency to avoid gambling stimuli. Values not different 
from zero are indicative of a lack of attentional biases, namely that there is no difference in 
the processing or in the maintenance of attention on gambling and non-gambling cues.  
 
Statistical analysis 
Data were analyzed with the IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, version 20.0. 
The alpha significance level was set at .05. A repeated analysis of variance 2 x 2 x 2x 2 with 
Group (non-problem gamblers vs. problem gamblers) as between and Valence (gambling vs. 
neutral), Validity (valid vs. invalid), cue presentation Time (100 ms vs. 500 ms) as within 
factors was conducted. A mixed ANOVA 2 x 2 was run on facilitation bias scores with one 
between-participant factor (Group: non-problem gamblers vs. problem gamblers) and two 
within-participant factors (facilitation bias at 100 and 500 ms). The same mixed ANOVA was 
executed on Disengagement bias scores. Finally, a single-sample t-test was performed on 
facilitation and disengagement biases in order to assess if bias scores differed significantly 
from zero. Associations among measures were assessed with zero-order correlations. 
 
Results  
The percentage of incorrect trials for the entire sample was 3.36%. Due to high percentage of 
missing data in the Posner Task, four participants (two belonging to the NPG group and two 
belonging to PG group) were excluded from the analysis on attentional bias scores. After 
selecting reaction times (RTs) only for correct responses, analyses on RTs were performed. A 
non-significant main effect of Valence (F(1,102)=0.10, p=.75), a main effect of Validity 
(F(1,102)=260.51, p<.001, η²=.71), and a main effect of Time (F(1,102)=260.26, p<.001, η²=.72) 
were found, with faster RTs for valid trials (RTs valid=389.34; RTs invalid=454.90) and for 
longer cue presentation (RTs 100 ms=443.74; RTs 500 ms=400.51).  
 
Valence x Group (F(1,102)=0.55, p=.46, η²=.00), Validity x Group (F(1,102)=0.41, p=.52), Time 
x Group (F(1,102)=0.19, p=.66), Valence x Validity (F(1,102)=0.90, p=.34), and Valence x Time 
(F(1,102)=1.99, p=.16) interactions were not significant. Validity x Time interaction reached 
significance level (F(1,102)=6.88, p=.01, η²=.06), indicating that RTs are faster for valid trials 
with longer presentation time (see Table 1). 
 
The interactions Valence x Time x Group, (F(1,102)= 0.33, p=.57), Validity x Time x Group, 
(F(1,102)=1.93, p=.17), Valence x Validity x Time, (F(1,102)=0.26, p=.61) and Valence x 
Validity x Time x Group, (F(1,102)=2.71, p=.10) fell short of the significance level. The 
ANOVA performed on facilitation bias scores showed a main effect of Time, (F(1,102)=4.04, 
p=.04, η2=.04), a not significant main effect of Group, (F(1,102)=0.01, p=.91) and a Group x 
Time interaction, (F(1,102)=5.14, p=.02, η2=.05). 
 
The same analysis was run on disengagement bias scores and revealed that neither the main 
effect of Time, (F(1,102)=0.28, p=.60), nor the main effect of Group, (F(1,102)=0.96, p=.33), nor 
a Group x Time interaction, (F(1,102)=0.37, p=.54) were significant. The single-sample t-test 
carried out on attentional bias scores revealed that NPGs showed neither facilitation bias (100 
ms: t51=0.63, p=.53; 500 ms: t51=0.70, p=.48) nor disengagement bias (100 ms: t51=-0.97, 
p=.34; 500 ms: t51=0.24, p=.81). In the PG group only, a facilitation bias at 100 ms (t51=3.15, 
p<.01), but not at 500 ms (t51=-0.97, p=.34), and no disengagement bias (100 ms: t51=0.67, 
p=.51; 500 ms: t51=0.59, p=.56) were observed (see Figure 2). 
 
Positive correlations between facilitation bias at 100 ms and craving were observed. More 
specifically, facilitation bias at 100 ms correlated with GACS anticipation (r = .239; p = .01), 
GACS relief (r = .245; p = .01) and GACS total score (r = .263; p < .01). The association 
between facilitation bias at 100 ms and GACS desire (r = .171; p = .08) failed to reach 
significance. No other correlations were found. 
 
Discussion 
The aims of the present study were to identify which attentional component and what type of 
bias would be involved in the attentional bias in problem gamblers (PGs) compared to non-
problem gamblers (NPGs). To answer these questions, a modified Posner Task was used 
(Posner, 1980). Another issue concerned the relationship between attentional bias to 
gambling cues and craving, on which there is no consensus in literature. Other factors such as 
emotional competence and emotional distress were also examined. 
 
The finding that PGs were faster in identifying gambling-related stimuli when presented at 
100 ms, with respect to neutral stimuli, indicated that attentional bias concerned the initial 
orientation of attention, namely the phase in which attention is captured by external stimuli, 
prior to any processing of it. This is in line with previous studies (Brevers et al., 2011a, 
2011b; Field and Cox, 2008; McCusker and Gettings, 1997; Molde et al., 2010) that have 
reported a faster detection of gambling-related stimuli in problem gamblers but not in healthy 
control groups. Nevertheless, some past studies (i.e., Grant and Bowling, 2015; Vizcaino et 
al., 2013) observed biases towards gambling cues only in the maintenance of attention. 
However, it should be noted that the cue presentation time used in these studies (i.e., 500 ms 
or more) hampered the exploration of the early engagement of attention, allowing the 
attentional maintenance only.  
 
Identifying which type of bias (facilitation, avoidance, or disengagement) was present in 
gambling was the secondary aim of this study. The shorter reaction time in responding to 
gambling stimuli by problem gamblers indicated that they exhibited a facilitation bias, 
namely facilitation in perceiving gambling stimuli compared to other type of stimuli. This 
finding is consistent with Brevers et al.’s (2011a) study in which problem gamblers were 
found to be faster in detecting gambling-related changes compared to neutral changes. 
However, contrary to the present study, they observed an engagement of attention towards 
gambling stimuli: problem gamblers directed their gaze toward gambling more frequently 
and for a longer time. The difference in the pattern of results was probably due to the 
attentional bias paradigm. More specifically, Brevers and colleagues (2011a) used a direct 
measure (Eye Gaze Monitoring) that records eye first movements and fixations, whereas in 
the present study an indirect measure based on RTs was employed.  
 
Correlational analysis revealed that facilitation in the initial orienting of attention was 
associated with motivational state of craving, contrary to previous studies that did not find an 
association between craving and attention (e.g. Brevers et al., 2011a; Wölfling et al., 2011). 
This was probably due to the sample characteristics. The Brevers and colleagues’ study 
mainly comprised problem gamblers while, in the present study, 67% of the sample met the 
criteria for probable pathological gambling (SOGS ≥ 5). As suggested by Young and Wohl 
(2009), GACS scale discriminates different levels of gambling severity, with craving scores 
being higher among those with a more severe gambling involvement. 
 
The correlation between the subjective feeling of “wanting” gambling and attentional bias 
suggests that the readiness in identifying gambling stimuli is not only due to a conditioning 
process resulting from the continuous gambling experience, but also that the desire to gamble 
may facilitate the perception of gambling stimuli in the environment. Such findings can be 
explained by Robinson and Berridge’s (1993, 2008) theory that views craving as important in 
determining addictive-related seeking-behaviors, in ‘grabbing’ addicts’ attention and in 
fostering relapses. However, the hypothesis that emotional distress and dysregulation would 
be associated with a focus on gambling stimuli among PGs was not confirmed.  
 
Limitations 
Several limitations of the present study should be noted. The use of self-report measures 
represents a possible source of bias as social desirability, and the use of an indirect measure 
for the bias could be less accurate when compared to direct measures. An additional 
limitation of the current study is that there was no identification of a gamblers' preferred 
mode of gambling. A previous study has indicated that attentional biases are related not only 
to general gambling cues but also specific to gambling preference (McCusker and Gettings, 
1997). Although the sample size in this study is greater than previous studies (Atkins and 
Sharp, 2003; Boyer and Dickerson, 2003; Brevers et al., 2011a; Diskin and Hodgins, 1999, 
2001; McCusker and Gettings, 1997; Molde et al., 2010; Zack and Poulos, 2004, 2007), 
further research should include larger sample of gamblers, to ensure greater generalizability 
of the results. Further studies should also include a group of disordered gamblers with a 
DSM-5 diagnosis in order to understand attentional bias pattern in a sample varying from 
non-gamblers to pathological gamblers.  
 
Conclusion 
The present study adds knowledge about the time course of attentional biases in gambling. 
More specifically the study demonstrates that an attentional preference for gambling stimuli 
is present only in individuals who have developed a problematic involvement in gambling 
activities. The novel findings regarding the relationship between desire to gamble and 
preferential allocation on gambling stimuli suggest that psychotherapy should focus on 
motivational states in order to modify attentional biases that, if focused on gambling stimuli, 
could induce addiction-related seeking-behaviors and facilitate gambling.  
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Table 1. Mean and SD in the modified Posner Task as a function of gambling group, validity, valence and cue 
presentation time. 
   NPG (N =54) PG (N =54) 
   M (SD) M (SD) 
100 ms Valid Gambling 405.44 (58.77) 416.88 (71.20) 
  Neutral 407.17 (54.17) 427.35 (68.04) 
 Invalid Gambling 456.38 (58.46) 489.63 (73.72) 
  Neutral 462.19 (64.17) 484.83 (70.00) 
500 ms Valid Gambling 350.19 (59.32) 379.81 (76.11) 
  Neutral 352.94 (58.62) 374.96 (60.77) 
 Invalid Gambling 425.19 (43.50) 450.79 (64.28) 
  Neutral 423.75 (48.34) 446.46 (58.72) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Modified version of Posner Task screen. The two columns illustrate a valid and an invalid trial, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Attentional bias scores as a function of Group (NPG=non-problem gamblers, PG=problem gamblers). 
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